"In 1974, the city of San Jose and Santa Clara County agreed to draw an urban-growth boundary outside of which development could not take place. Inside the boundary growth could continue unabated, but growth outside would be strictly limited. East of San Jose are tens of thousands of acres of marginal agricultural land, and the growth boundary effectively placed these lands off limits to development. Since most other communities in the San Jose urban area are landlocked by San Jose or other cities, this boundary effectively constrained the entire San Jose urban area.
Taking after Ramapo, San Jose said it would add land to the growth boundary when financing could be assured for the urban services needed for new developments. But in 1978, California voters passed Proposition 13, which strictly limited the property taxes cities could collect for urban services. This made California cities dependent on sales taxes and therefore reluctant to devote more land to residential areas. As a result, San Jose has never expanded its urban-growth boundary.
Even before Proposition 13, cities throughout the San Francisco Bay Area had approved a variety of growth-management policies, including growth boundaries, density limits, and purchases of land for open space. While growth-management planning is supposedly aimed at protecting environmental quality, it is exceedingly vulnerable to manipulation by not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) advocates whose hidden goal is to boost their property values by limiting the supply of housing for others. As MIT planning professor Bernard Frieden notes in his 1979 book, "The Environmental Protection Hustle," one important limit to growth was a public involvement process that made it so easy for people to challenge proposed developments that "even a lone boy scout doing an ecology project was able to bring construction to a halt on a 200-unit condominium project."8
Berkeley planning professor David Dowall's 1984 book, "The Suburban Squeeze," points out that people living in a neighborhood of $200,000 homes fear that an adjacent development of $100,000 homes will bring down their property values, but they will welcome a development of $300,000 homes. When NIMBYs object to plans, developers respond by eliminating readily affordable housing and proposing to build only expensive houses. For example, one proposal to build 2,200 homes selling for $25,000 to $35,000 on 685 acres in Oakland was, due to public opposition, scaled back to a mere 150 homes that would sell for $175,000 to $200,000.9
Federal, state, county, city, and regional governments were able to tie up a huge amount of potential residential land in the Bay Area as open space. According to Dowall, by 1984 "over 15 percent of the region's total land supply [was] in permanent open space controlled by" various government agencies.10 Ostensibly this was for environmental protection, but the hilltops that were reserved tended to have the lowest values for fisheries, wildlife, and streams. The main effect of such reservations was a significant boost of land prices throughout the region.
Proposition 13 spurred city governments to go farther than ever before in beggar-thy-neighbor efforts to force residential developments into adjacent cities while capturing retail developments, and the sales taxes they generated, for themselves. As one city put up barriers to growth, that growth would spill over into nearby cities, leading them to erect their own barriers. "Santa Clara County cities have become extremely combative," observed Dowall, "fighting back with a variety of growth-restricting mechanisms that have made each community a 'tight little island.'"11
As a result of these policies, California was the first state to suffer planner-induced housing bubbles. By the 1980 census, price-to-income ratios in many California regions, including Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, and San Jose, ranged from 4 to 4.5, and Santa Barbara was a staggering 4.8. California was also the first state to suffer the bursting of a housing bubble: between 1989 and 1994, housing prices in most of these regions fell from 15–25%. Fortunately, other parts of the United States thrived, so the nation as a whole did not suffer a severe depression."
(Liberty - Why Do Houses Cost So Much?)