"Terry Semel was pissed. The Yahoo CEO had offered to buy Google for roughly $3 billion, but the young Internet search firm wasn't interested. Once upon a time, Google's founders had come to Yahoo for an infusion of cash; now they were turning up their noses at what Semel believed was a perfectly reasonable offer. Worse, Semel's lieutenants were telling him that, in fact, Google was probably worth at least $5 billion. This was way back in the summer of 2002, two years before Google went public. An age before Google's stock soared above $500 a share, giving the company a market value of $147 billion -- right behind Chevron and just ahead of Intel...
At the end of 2001, few people were saying that there were billions to be made by serving up text ads every time an Internet user ran a search. But Bill Gross, the indefatigable entrepreneur behind the business incubator IdeaLab, was all over the concept. In 1998, he had launched a search site called GoTo.com. Other search engines promised results based on human-built directories or computer-driven algorithms. Gross' search site auctioned its results to the highest bidder.
At the time, the idea seemed radical, even offensive. Who would want results driven by hordes of sellers hawking goods and services? Advertisers would, as it turned out. Although GoTo never became a top-tier search destination, Gross and CEO Ted Meisel quickly saw that the big Web portals and search engines like AltaVista, Yahoo, AOL, and MSN would pay big money for GoTo's auction-driven results. They changed the name to Overture in 2001, and by the end of that year Web surfers had clicked on Overture ads 1.4 billion times. Advertisers understood the value of being able to bid for juicy keywords. The ads would be laser targeted, and the results -- clicks -- could be measured precisely. The portals and search sites figured out that the sponsored links could be placed alongside a more objective set of search results. It was a brilliant way to turn searches into revenue.
Google saw the power of this approach and decided to grow its own. Engineers at Google took the concept of pay-per-click search results and in 2002 turned it into a smooth-running, money-printing machine called AdWords. The company developed an automated process for advertisers to bid on keywords. It also made the auctions more sophisticated so customers couldn't game the system. Crucially, Google determined ad prominence on a Web page not just by the price advertisers were willing to pay per click -- as Overture had done -- but also based on how many clickthroughs that ad generated. As a result, Google's system responded quickly to ineffective ads: They disappeared. Google also had a massive database that tracked which ads worked and which didn't, information it could pass on to its customers to help them create better ad campaigns. By the time Google published its financial statements for the first time in 2004, everyone knew that the company had harnessed one of the great innovations of the Internet age.
All this is what prompted Semel to make his bid for Google. When that failed, he pushed ahead with plan B. In late 2002, Yahoo acquired Inktomi, which many believed had the second-best search technology on the planet. (Google was still tops.) The price: a bargain $257 million. Then, in mid-2003, Semel's patient negotiations with Overture bore fruit. He paid $1.4 billion for the search-driven ad pioneer, roughly 25 percent less than the original asking price...
When Yahoo decided it was going to buy Overture in 2002, Overture dominated search-related advertising; its revenue was two times Google's. By the time the deal was actually announced in 2003, the two companies were neck and neck. Two years later, Google's revenue was 2.5 times Overture's."
(Wired News)